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Deriving Privacy and Security Considerations for










The internet-of-things (IoT) consists of embedded devices and their
networks of communication as they form decentralized frameworks
of ubiquitous computing services. Within such decentralized sys-
tems the potential for malicious actors to impact the system is
signiicant, with far-reaching consequences. Hence this work ad-
dresses the challenge of providing IoT systems engineers with a
framework to elicit privacy and security design considerations,
speciically for indoor adaptive smart environments. It introduces
a new ambient intelligence indoor adaptive environment frame-
work (CORE) which leverages multiple forms of data, and aims
to elicit the privacy and security needs of this representative sys-
tem. This contributes both a new adaptive IoT framework, but also
an approach to systematically derive privacy and security design
requirements via a combined and modiied OCTAVE-Allegro and
Privacy-by-Design methodology. This process also informs the fu-
ture developments and evaluations of the CORE system, toward
engineering more secure and private IoT systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ambient intelligent and context-aware environments describe tech-
nologies which have the property of being embedded, context-
aware, personalized, adaptive, and anticipatory [1]. This its the
category of internet of things applications closely, wherein en-
vironments must make sense of user situations to inform reac-
tive decision-making wherein the environment provides multiple
(agent) behaviors on behalf of users. Context, in this sense, is im-
portant and typically deined as łany information that can be used
to ascertain the situation of a persona or entity,ž [2, 19] while con-
text awareness here refers to a systems capability for applying and
making sense of context sources.
Context, however, is inherently multidimensional, encompassing
a wide variety of signals and data sources (potentially for multiple
users and scenarios). This demands that ambient intelligent systems
designs are sensitive to changes in a host of potential and multidi-
mensional contexts, for multiple users and scenarios. The internet
of things (IoT) is a central mechanism for bringing these contexts
to the forefront, allowing for the aggregation and sense-making
that is needed to develop a common operating picture for an en-
vironment, toward situational awareness and decision-making for
many IoT-speciic applications and stakeholders, i.e., system users,
service providers, and other actors or agents.
This often represents a distributed system, as a service-oriented
architecture, and as a result of its distributed design introduces a
host of security and privacy challenges. Security, here considered
as maintaining the operation of the system as designed, without
external inluence of unauthorized actors ś malicious or otherwise
ś is also multi-dimensional and varied. As such, the secure opera-
tion of each module within the internet of things application must
be considered, alongside the many potential events impacting its
operation. This includes security of decision-making and informa-
tion processing and storage elements generating and maintaining
information assets.
Privacy within the IoT can be considered in terms of security of
information access within such systems, maintaining communica-
tion channels and the data being transferred across these channels.
As a distributed system highly dependent on communication of
potentially sensitive sensory information across complex and dy-
namic networks, the internet of things has high privacy needs that
must be brought to the forefront, throughout the lifecycle of such
systems (including design, development, deployment and activa-
tion, runtime, and deactivation). Hence, developing a functional
and privacy-enhanced system is a considerable challenge in this
complex systems landscape.
This work considers the privacy and security needs of adaptive
and context aware environments, particularly for indoor uses, as a
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step toward understanding these design considerations for internet
of things deployments. This involves the design of a prototype
system, based on a new CORE (COntextual REality) internet of
things framework which has a multimedia focus, aimed at both the
acquisition of context fromwithin an indoor environment as well as
a streamlined presentation of IoT system decisions made using this
context. This represents an initial testbed design, with multiple data
sources to be considered, speciically as it aims to apply advances
in computer vision alongside traditional sensing mechanisms, and
angles toward advanced visualization, particularly through mixed
reality approaches. This system itself could also potentially have
future applications in both outdoor and vehicular situations.
While the scope of this work is primarily to explore privacy and
security considerations for an initial prototype of this CORE system,
it also highlights the need to consider both łhumans-in-the-loopž
as well as łthings-in-the-loop.ž In doing so, the target contributions
of this work involve i) the presentation of a contextual architecture
for internet of things systems, ii) an early prototype framework
deployment, iii) an exploration of the derivation of security and pri-
vacy considerations for this framework. This targets future system
developers and researchers of highly contextual internet of things
systems. To discover the required design considerations, this stage
of the work merges two existing frameworks, namely a minimized
version of the OCTAVE-Allegro methodology for eliciting security
considerations [9], alongside the Privacy-by-Design (PbD) princi-
ples of [18], toward systematically eliciting privacy and security in
IoT systems engineering.
The process of deriving privacy ad security considerations is
presented as follows: Section 1 has provided an overview of the
need for both privacy and security in the internet of things domain,
as a multi-dimensional problem. Section 2 briely introduces the
background to internet of things research, toward the CORE archi-
tecture, and elements of adaptive environment systems. Section 3
describes the CORE architecture from a multidimensional design
perspective. Section 4 presents an initial indoor smart environment
prototype based on the CORE architecture, and its design modules.
Section 5 discusses the approach toward deriving security and pri-
vacy considerations for the CORE prototype, as implemented and
highlights concepts of the OCTAVE-Allegro methodology and the
Privacy-by-Design framework that have been applied. Section 6
provides a summary discussion of these approaches, and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 INTERNET-OF-THINGS FOR ADAPTIVE
CONTEXT ENVIRONMENTS
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm represents a wide range of in-
terconnected networks of sensors, devices, and the infrastructures
they enable and support. In this rapidly advancing technology, as
seen by surveys like [7, 8], edge and cloud computation allows for
sensing and sharing of data and knowledge across these systems,
and their use cases range among a plethora of domains, whether
for interconnected vehicles, or for interconnected individuals and
homes. In this space a host of rich problems arise and are being ad-
dressed in terms of hardware and software, protocols, and usage pa-
rameters [16]. However, there remains a need for human-centered
design approaches, as IoT interaction, enabled by mobile devices,
Figure 1: The technologies needed for adaptive context envi-
ronments.
augmented reality head mounted displays, and other wearables and
networked devices, is set to revolutionize society.
When considering an adaptive context environment, enabled by
the internet of things, this involves: i) networks, ii) interconnectiv-
ity, iii) domain application hardware and software, and iv) internet
online services. These are depicted in Figure 1, showing several
overlapping elements. In terms of networks, this incorporates dy-
namic interactions between devices, embedded in the environment,
which provide sensors, actuators, and ambient controllers. The
interconnectivity of these core elements leverages telecommuni-
cation protocols, typically wirelessly (or directly via Ethernet) and
provides for complex systems of communication. Within this, hard-
ware and software technologies rely on the networking standards
and protocols (such as HTTP, or TCP, etc). Examples of this include
backend servers, routers and gateways, mobile devices, and even
technologies like embedded processors. A number of domain appli-
cations also leverage the interconnectivity and sensor aspects of
the internet of things, particularly for headsets, wearable technolo-
gies, and gaming, including virtual and augmented reality devices.
Together with online services, providing access to platforms and
API’s, adaptive environments efects a large scale decentralization
of the internet of things, including decentralized processing and
storage services; this must be developed with an eye for the human
factor issues and socio-technical systems challenges, like privacy
and security, that everyday interaction and scenarios bring to the
forefront, [24].
3 CORE ARCHITECTURE
As indicated, the aim of this work is to present a CORE IoT archi-
tectural framework for adaptive environments and to explore its
security and privacy implications and considerations on a proto-
type. Speciically, the CORE (Contextual Reality) approach to smart
environments engages a combination of perspectives, aimed at the
dual system design targets of i) providing environmental context to
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the IoT system controllers, and ii) providing appropriate system vi-
sualizations and interfaces for humans-in-the-loop of the IoT. This
centers on six development perspectives, namely i) the virtual, ii)
ambient, iii) collaborative, iv) informational context, v) inferential,
and vi) networking perspectives. These are shown in Figure 2, and
described as follows:
The virtual perspective targets the design of visual interfaces for
humans-in-the-loop, with a focus toward next generation mixed
augmented reality interfaces. In this, established computer graphics
scenes are considers, such as using Unity3D, and controllers within
Unity, like the ML-Agents framework. The ambient perspective
aims toward the traditional designs of the internet of things, involv-
ing objects, object controllers, and control logic. This speaks to the
awareness of actual environment details. This includes the pres-
ence of individuals within the system, and any interface hardware
available, with AR viewers being highlighted.
The collaborative perspective highlights the notion that such
systems must account for the fact that multiple users can engage
within the environment, each having potentially unique goals, roles,
states, and tasks. Additionally, multiple IoT objects, like cameras,
microphones, speakers, and switches, are within the environment
and may be used in service of these varied users.
Likewise, the informational context perspective addresses the
need to consider the variety of information sources, and how those
sources are provided to controllers for processing and decision-
making. This may involve varied IoT objects and IoT agents as
controllers and monitors of such objects.
The inferential perspective considers the potential for advances
in machine learning and computer vision for making sense of situa-
tions through video feeds and other incoming information streams.
In this architecture, trained data is used to provide models as an
inference library, for instance using TensorFlow [35], for infor-
mation agents within the system to access context from pattern
recognition.
The networking perspective addresses the needs for communica-
tion within the system, particularly as middleware for the objects
and agents within the system, on the one hand, and the various plat-
forms in the cloud, on the other. Further, the access to information
resources like the model library for inferencing are also considered.
This networking perspective considers technologies like backend
server frameworks like Redis [30] or Flask [11], protocol technolo-
gies like MQTT [25], and even socket and tunnel layers, like NGrok
[26].
The next section deepens this architecture into a framework and
early prototype, which centers heavily on the ambient, inferential,
informational, and networking perspectives as a starting point for fu-
ture research. This prototype will be considered in further sections
from a security and privacy standpoint.
4 CORE PROTOTYPE
4.1 Overview
The CORE prototype implementation is shown in Figure 3, and
represents initial components for an instantiation of the IoT aspects
of the CORE architecture, with the visualization perspective left for
future development. The prototype consists of two consumer voice
interface devices (Google Home and Amazon Alexa [5, 15]), and
a Pixel Phone running Google Assistant [13], each being able to
use a shared camera sensor on a Raspberry Pi [29] to take pictures
of objects, or faces, to identify them using two machine learning
models. These models are served up as their own endpoints on a
local-area-network(LAN), which are requested via webhooks on a
Raspberry Pi device. Any Google Assistant enabled device or Alexa
device can access this low. This is a proof of concept scenario,
which will inform future prototypes and examples.
The driving idea is to serve model processes as an API endpoint
for requests by decentralized components. In this way, local area de-
vices, regardless of their make or type, could simply send an HTTP
request for batch processing, or singular processing of images and
video frames. This was informed by Guinard’s idea around a web of
things [17] which looks at using web based architectures and proto-
cols, to help manage the IoT in a more accessible and friendly way.
It also gives the network some lexibility, as heavy processing can
be oloaded from smaller devices to a larger server. The structure of
using an API endpoint means that the model processes are available
across network, rather than being conined to a singular device.
This also gives the ability for the network to run model processes
without the presence of the internet. Some devices may need to
access cloud based services to operate, but others do not, and hence
łthingsž within a sensor network, and any machine learning (ML)
processes can operate normally within a local distributed network.
4.2 CORE Prototype Components
łThere are three fundamental components that combine to form
an IoT node: intelligence, sensing, and wireless communicationsž
[39]. The CORE prototype addresses this notion via the elements
highlighted below.
MLModels: This component highlights machine learning models,
pre-trained on speciic datasets, that are ofered up as services to
other devices on the network. They reside as their own contained
processes on a backend server, and can handle classiications, such
as identifying properties within images or video frames that are sent
to them over the network. These are run on a Tensorlow framework
with Keras API’s for development [20]. Example pre-trained models
would include object detection models like Tiny Yolo, Tiny-SSD
[31, 38], or those trained on image and face-detection datasets
like ImageNet, COCO, or FaceNet [21, 23, 33], or pose and gesture
detection like Pose-net, [12, 27].
Backend Server: This component addresses the need for a backend
server machine that runs locally on the network and handles theML
processes. In this instance, a combination of Redis, and Apache [6],
serves up Flask endpoints for devices to access the ML processes,
as in [20].
Embedded CORE Service Devices (ECSD): This component ad-
dresses service devices, including custom sensors, actuators and
more general devices like Raspberry Pis. These difer from com-
mercial service devices, and are arranged to work together as a
sensor network. In this instance, this is managed by the Raspberry
Pi device as a resource broker. These devices can include things
like temperature or humidity sensors, light sensors, proximity de-
vices, and room based cameras. Combined, these operate to gather
the state of the room, and can be accessed by software or agents
operating on the local-area-network (LAN) of the institution.
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Figure 2: TheCORE IoT framework for adaptive context aware internet of things, with both IoT andmixed reality visualisation
elements.
Figure 3: Early CORE prototoype set of components for implementing the IoT element of the architecture, leveraging [20].
Embedded Commercial Cloud Devices (ECCD): This component
outlines devices within the system that require the support of a
cloud based service to operate, or also for setup, initialization, and
registration. They include items such as a Google Pixel Phone,
Wemo Switches, Google Home, and Amazon Alexa assistant devices
[5, 15, 37] ś each are generally commercial devices that are tied
closely to their parent company systems.
Cloud Services: This component addresses cloud services, i.e.,
remote services made available on demand via the internet. In this
case this includes platforms such as Google Cloud [14] that provide
services for Google Home, and natural language processing. Alexa
Skills Kit for the Alexa devices [4], and Ngrok which provides a
way to make secure tunnels to localhost. NGrok provides a way
to host a webhook fulillment, and to provide remote access for
monitoring.
Network Middleware: This component addresses the middleware
protocols and networking devices employed in system commu-
nication. This includes institutional routers (and portable travel
routers), messaging protocols like MQTT [17], and web protocols
like HTTP. the purpose of these protocols is to provide devices with
a framework to communicate with one another both locally and
remotely. This element of the system is of high signiicance.
4.3 Networking Designs and IoT Functionality
The network itself is broken down into ML Models, the backend
server, CORE Embedded Service Devices, Embedded Commercial
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Cloud Service Devices, Network Middleware, and Cloud Services.
The models, API endpoints for the models, and the message broker
that they communicate with, reside on their own backend server.
This server has no wider access outside of the LAN. The various
diferent embedded devices operate on the LAN, but may or may
not require internet access depending on their make, and purpose.
So for example, a non commercial range or temperature sensor,
would be operating locally, but a commercial device like a Google
Home, would require access to cloud services.
A travel router in this design has been employed to ofer addi-
tional lexibility when IoT devices are not allowed to work on a
wider area network. This, essentially is a router setup speciically
for IoT networked devices, which accounts for common issues faced
by, and reported about, IoT devices in general, such as in [17]. It
also allows for use of common operating system functions like
secure shell (SSH), or use of particular ports, and a visualization
dashboard, which are sometimes blocked at the institution level. It
further separates LAN traic from the institutional network, which
is often shared by many unknown devices, which would also be
able to access the API endpoint if it were not in place. This keeps
any possible tunnel compromises to the LAN, and helps mitigate
positioning leaks, such as those highlighted in [36].
Additionally, the RaspberryPi (Pi) unit is acting as a host to
particular sensors like a camera module, and also as a central point
for other room devices to publish their sensor data. These devices
can accomplish this by publishing data in an MQTT channel that
can be subscribed to by application devices. The idea here is to
distribute the activity on the network, so that the backend server is
not handling every request or activity. This provides some lexibility
in terms of data availability, as devices can subscribe to the Pi for
room based sensor data, and access the the models at the same time.
If, for example, a device was locally running its own agent on its
hardware and did not need the models provided by the API, but
did need the data from the room, it could do this without adding
extra load to the backend server. Further, this approach gives the
ability to run local webhooks for web service fulillment, such as
via Amazon Alexa, and gives a spot to run an NGrok tunnel without
running it on a main backend server.
Figures 4 and 5 present the lows of information within the
network, which depends on each device. Most devices on the local
area network can make direct requests to the API endpoint on the
backend server to access the models. Devices like a Google home
that depend on an external service, would use the main network and
gateway to access their services, however the webhook fulillment
would rely on the tunnel.
5 DERIVING SECURITY AND PRIVACY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORE IOT
The previous section highlighted the design of a prototype inter-
net of things framework as a irst step toward a capability which
incorporates multiple perspectives, while allowing potential to
bring multi-modal contextual information into the IoT system for
sense-making, and in future toward potential visualization for users
within the IoT system. The prototype addresses this core function-
ality, but has not been designed directly with privacy and security
as a primary goal. This section aims to systematically understand
Figure 4: Request communication for a device on LAN setup.
the privacy and security landscape of the CORE system, leveraging
a repeatable, methodological approach. Two design tools from lit-
erature have been considered, based on the work of [9] on deriving
security considerations, on the one hand, and [18] for determin-
ing privacy design guidelines, on the other. To bridge these, the
following steps are conducted, as in Figure 6.
The irst step involves selecting and clarifying the CORE IoT
components in order to situationally assess the security and privacy
needs of each. The second step involves following elements of the
OCTAVE-Allegro method where possible, to produce a set of secu-
rity threats and risk proile scenarios. With an understanding of
the risks faced by the CORE system in particular, the next step is to
gain a similar understanding of privacy needs for this system, using
Privacy-by-Design guidelines. These allow for the inal step of de-
riving a combined set of security and privacy considerations for the
CORE IoT prototype, as outlined within the following subsections.
5.1 OCTAVE-Allegro Methodology for CORE
The OCTAVE-Allegro risk assessment framework has been pro-
posed in 2007 [9] as a fast and light-weight methodology based
on the pre-existing OCTAVE methodology, applied by the military
and large organizational teams, toward identifying and evaluating
information security risks. This more recent reinement is targeted
toward much smaller groups and individuals aiming to develop
łbroad assessment of an organization’s operational risk environ-
ment...without the need for extensive risk assessment knowledgež
[9]. This approach has recently begun to be investigated in the
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Figure 5: Request communication for cloud service devices.
IoT domain toward gaining an understanding of IoT security, as
in [3]. The OCTAVE-Allegro methodology consists of eight steps
toward four key tasks, namely establishing drivers, proile assets,
identiication of threats, and identiication and mitigation of risks,
[9].
In this work, a modiied approach to the OCTAVE-Allegro has
been conducted, with a main focus on providing a quick snapshot of
the security proile of the CORE prototype. As such, it is OCTAVE-
Allegro inspired, and focuses on four themes, as seen in Figure 7.
The irst step is to identify information assets for each component
of the system. The next step involves identifying threats for each
information asset identiied. For each threat, potential mitigation
Figure 6: Methodology for deriving security and privacy
considerations using OCTAVE-Allegro [9] and Privacy-by-
Design [18] guidelines.
Figure 7: An OCTAVE-Allegro [9] inspired approach to un-
derstand security considerations.
approaches are selected, and lastly, for each mitigation approach a
design consideration is developed.
While this shortens the OCTAVE-Allegro approach, it continues
to provide useful tools to understand information assets and threats,
and potential mitigation approaches, as in Figure 9.
5.1.1 Information Assets and Threats. In terms of the CORE system
the information assets of each component has been identiied, based
on considering the relative value of the pieces of information within
the component. For the machine learning models library this refers
to the trained neural net models, the incoming data streams to these
models, and the outgoing classiication results from each model. For
the backend server this refers to the model processing framework,
the REST API endpoints for accessing models, the request queues
or bufers (in Redis) for incoming service calls, and iv) the internal
data stored on the server (in Redis). For the embedded CORE service
devices this refers to audio camera or video feeds, sensory data, and
the hardware related assets of each device, namely the IP address,
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MAC address, or embedded processors. For embedded commercial
cloud service devices this refers to details relating to account pro-
iles, passwords, and the physical devices themselves which are
allowed to connect to the varied services. For cloud services this
refers to information related to accounts, service-speciic data and
API access points, as well as authorized device connections. For
network middleware, this refers to information related to network
traic, routers and gateway connections. These information assets
each require particular focus on the kinds of security events that
may take place.
5.1.2 Threats and Potential Mitigation Approaches. With an un-
derstanding of the information assets within the system, a set of
unique threats has been identiied, and can be considered for the
system in terms of security scenarios. This includes the following:
Altered models: Attackers may be able to enter the system and
modify an ML model. This has a moderately high impact, but may
be mitigated by performing validation checks on the model and its
access. Data theft: Attackers may be able to steal copies of informa-
tion assets. This has a moderately high risk, but can be mitigated
by encryption techniques. Data falsiication: Attackers may be able
to inject falsiied information into the system. This has a high risk,
but may be mitigated by validating the source of information, via
keys, or IP addresses, or even blockchain methods. Data destruction:
Attackers may be able to delete information within the system.
This has a high impact, but may be mitigated by making frequent
backups of resources. Identity theft: Attackers may be able to access
the system via authorized channels, or unsecured data channels,
or by redirecting network traic. This has a high impact but can
be mitigated somewhat via decentralizing information channels
and authorization endpoints. Resource overruns: Attackers may be
able to overlow system information resource handling or bufers
by spamming requests. This has a moderate impact, but may be
mitigated by blocking ofending traic IP addresses, or using val-
idation methods. Hardware identity theft: Attackers may be able
to enter the network by using a compromised version of the sys-
tem hardware. This is a high risk event, but may be mitigated by
conducting validation checks, routine physical checks of hardware,
and encryption techniques. Malicious software: Attackers may be
able to use malicious software to gain access to network and in-
formation assets, or cause data losses. This is a high impact event,
but may be mitigated via antivirus software and routine updates.
Hardware theft: Attackers may gain access to physical hardware
and any information assets on the device, or that can be accessed
via the device. This is a high impact event, but may be mitigated
by having better passwords, password security strategies, or en-
cryption. Access to cloud-based assets: Attackers may gain access
to cloud service infrastructures being used by the system. This has
a signiicant impact, but may be beyond control, as the attacker is
at the site of the cloud service center. Two-factor authentication
may help to mitigate such an event. Network iniltration: Attackers
may gain access to network traic and may be able to read/decrypt
information assets or packets. This is a moderate risk to system
functionality, but may be mitigated by using strong encryption
methods. Together, this set of scenarios highlights some of the cen-
tral events that the CORE system designs must account for in terms
of security.
Figure 8: Privacy by design strategies, as in [18].
5.2 Privacy-by-Design Strategies for CORE
Privacy within ubiquitous systems has been a long-held design con-
sideration [22], but remains a current and important challenge for
IoT system designers and engineers [28]. From a legal perspective,
privacy has been the subject of much attention, as big data trends
continue, and with more personal quantiied data being gathered
from users [32]. Recently, Privacy-by-Design strategies have been
brought to the forefront [18, 32] toward providing inherent data
protection, and the concept has had need of frameworks for eluci-
dating the fuzzy privacy needs of systems. Frameworks like [28]
are being tested to assess their impact on engineering more private
systems.
In this work, the Privacy-by-Design strategies of [18] have been
considered as a simpliied starting point, as it is based closely on
privacy and data protection laws and accounts for the needs of the
software development life cycle. In particular, eight privacy design
strategies were proposed, toward potential privacy design patterns.
These are seen in Figure 8, and consist of strategies for i) Minimiza-
tion of private information used by the system, ii) separation of
private information within the system, iii) aggregation of private
information when possible within the system, iv) hiding of private
information from plain view within the system, v) informing users
when private information is being used, vi) allowing users to have
a measure of control over how or when this information is used by
the system, vii) enforcement of a known privacy policy, and viii)
demonstration of adherence to the agreed on privacy policy. With
the exception of the latter two strategies related to privacy policies,
this full set of privacy by design guidelines have been considered.
5.2.1 PbD and OCTAVE for CORE Components. Through cross-
application of both the PbD strategies, and the OCTAVE-Allegro
security assessment, it is possible to understand how the compo-
nents of the system are impacted by speciic security threats, on the
one hand, but then how these same information assets and threats
relate to privacy needs for each information asset in the system.
This mapping is shown in Figure 9, and highlights the utility of this
approach as a methodology toward merging privacy and security
concepts. For each information asset, security considerations re-
sult from elicited mitigation strategies as in the OCTAVE-Allegro,
while privacy considerations derive from cross-referencing threats
to information assets per component with PbD strategies. This
mapping together results in a listing of both privacy considerations
Session: Internet of Things and Cloud-based Services MPS'18, October 15, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada
8
Figure 9: Mapping Privacy-by-Design and OCTAVE-Allegro security needs for CORE IoT components.
and security considerations, and can be clearly identiied as design
requirements, as in Figure 10, for the CORE prototype.
Speciically, a set of 16 unique privacy considerations have been
derived for the system, and 22 security considerations. These re-
fer directly to Figure 9, and introduce aspects of design which, if
possible and practical, the system should incorporate. This set of
considerations also lends itself toward potential system evaluations,
as it can be seen clearly how well the system meets each design
consideration. As such, the current version of the CORE system has
a resulting set of directions toward making privacy and security
enhancements.
6 DISCUSSION
The development of an IoT system leverages diferent core compo-
nents and tools, each with their own frameworks and API functions,
communication channels, and protocols. It is important that systems
designers have tools to consider the security needs of such systems,
and the impact of systems on privacy needs of users, whether in-
dividuals or organizations. The methodology applied here shows
an approach toward understanding the security risks that impact
such a system, as well as the privacy risks. When combined this
represents a useful toolset for system engineers. In many cases,
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Figure 10: Privacy and security considerations discovered for the CORE IoT prototype, for future system improvement.
however, IoT developers may not consider such techniques, either
by design or as an oversight, but the risks remain.
The proposed approach has leveraged two existing methods for
understanding security and privacy, and has derived a set of design
considerations for the speciic CORE prototype. A comparison of
this with existing techniques is a clear avenue for future research.
Also, it remains to be seen whether these design considerations
result in a more secure and private system in practice, and whether
the development costs of implementation of these concerns is fea-
sible and beneicial. These are two important aspects for further
research, and future work will aim to systematically assess the im-
pact of introducing the security and privacy considerations derived
in this work. It is hoped that this will allow for a more secure and
private system, although this remains for further exploration. How-
ever, as researchers continue to consider the approaches combined
in this work, like [28] for Privacy-by-Design in IoT, and [3] for IoT
security with OCTAVE-Allegro, it is expected that this merger will
aid developers.
6.1 Maker Perspectives and Security
łYou have a 9/10 chance that somebody already made it and that it’s
posted somewhere on the site. Youwould be dumb not to use itž [10].
The approach to this prototype is brought about from a more maker
perspective where, for this sake of this paper, aMaker can be deined
as someone who participates in Maker subculture and general Do-
it-Yourself (DiY) movements, as in [34]. The DiY culture refers to a
societal movement of doing and making things oneself, originating
from dissatisfaction with current society [10]. Making is generally
seen as a democratization of techniques and technologies [34], and
Makers are interdisciplinary people, who participate in a lot of
diferent communities from crafters, and hobbyists, to hackers and
professionals [34]. A maker approach can be thought of as relying
on experimentation and having a prototyping-irst mindset. While
traditionally a software development approach to implementing
connected devices can be thought of as a plan irst approach, a
maker approach tinkers irst, re-working an uninished project,
using existing materials to inform creation, or building on projects
or creation processes that have already been done in the past [10].
One issue is that maker related tools, and discussion, do not really
focus on security of those tools, as security is often at odds with
experimentation and sandboxing.
This means that maker approaches and entry points as outlined
by Dries De Roeck et al [10], are sometimes hampered, or put into
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a position of only existing purely externally in the cloud, or com-
pletely locally (which is not always possible). IoT projects can now
involve many diferent kinds of devices, as shown above in even
a basic prototype, that can span from DIY based board, and sen-
sors, to commercial products which can have requirements that
are not always in the best interest of IT security. In the case of the
CORE Network, the current prototype was developed by leveraging
existing tutorials, open source software libraries, and following
the examples of implementation provided by existing community
members. The entry point for the project, was a combination of con-
sidering what hardware elements already existed at arm’s length,
and how they could be utilized together. Hence, security and pri-
vacy enabling strategies like the one here proposed have utility
in allowing system engineers, especially makers, to clearly assess
design decisions and the systems that result.
7 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The internet of things represents a systems engineering paradigm
with inherent privacy and security challenges due to its growing
ubiquitous and decentralized components, service-oriented archi-
tectures, and embedded systems frameworks. It is increasingly
imperative for IoT systems designers and engineers to have tools
that help to clarify the privacy and security needs of these systems
throughout their lifecycles. This work has aimed to explore and
address this need by presenting a new IoT system design, aimed
at an indoor smart environment that leverages information from
multimedia sources, such as sensing and computer vision, and that
aims at maintaining a human-centered approach. The security and
privacy of this system has been derived using a merger of a risk-
assessment methodology for security considerations with a set of
privacy-by-design strategies. This has resulted in a structured set of
both privacy and security considerations for the proposed system.
The next stages of this work will aim to assess whether the im-
plementation of these privacy and security considerations, where
practical and possible, can enhance the existing system in practice.
It is hoped that future researchers will leverage similar techniques
for a wide range of IoT systems.
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